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Abstract: It is now feasible to host basic web services on a smart phone due to the advances in wireless devices and 
mobile communication technologies. The market capture of mobile web services also has increased 
significantly, in the past years. While the applications are quite welcoming, the ability to provide secure and 
reliable communication in the vulnerable and volatile mobile ad-hoc topologies is vastly becoming 
necessary. Even though a lot of standardized security specifications like WS-Security, SAML exist for web 
services in the wired networks, not much has been analyzed and standardized in the wireless environments. 
In this paper we give our analysis of adapting some of the security standards, especially WS-Security to the 
cellular domain, with performance statistics. The performance latencies are obtained and analyzed while 
observing the performance and quality of service of our Mobile Host.    
1 INTRODUCTION 
From the view-point of information systems 
engineering, the Internet has lead the evolution from 
static content to Web Services. Web Services are 
software components that can be accessed over the 
Internet using well established web mechanisms, 
XML-based open standards and transport protocols 
such as SOAP (W3C, 2003) and HTTP. Public 
interfaces of Web Services are defined and described 
using Web Service Description Language (WSDL) 
(Christensen, 2001), regardless of their platforms, 
implementation details. Web Services have wide 
range of applications and primarily used for 
integration of different organizations. The biggest 
advantage of Web Services lies in their simplicity in 
expression, communication and servicing. The 
componentized architecture of Web Services also 
makes them reusable, thereby reducing the 
development time and costs. (Booth, 2004) 
Simultaneously, the high-end mobile phones and 
PDAs are becoming pervasive and are being used in 
wide range of applications like location based 
services, banking services, ubiquitous computing 
etc. The higher data transmission rates achieved in 
wireless domains with 3G (3GPP, 2006) and 4G 
(Thomas, 1999) technologies also boosted this 
growth in the cellular market. The situation brings 
out a large scope and demand for software 
applications for such high-end mobile devices.  
To meet this demand of the cellular domain and 
to reap the benefits of the fast growing web services 
domain and standards, the scope of the mobile 
terminals as both web services clients and providers 
is being observed. While mobile web service clients 
are common these days, we have studied the scope 
of mobile web service provisioning. The details of 
our Mobile Host and its performance analysis are 
available at (Srirama, 2006a). 
While service delivery and management from 
Mobile Host is technically feasible, the ability to 
provide secure and reliable communication in the 
vulnerable and volatile mobile ad-hoc topologies 
vastly becomes necessary. Moreover with the easily 
readable mobile web services, the complexity to 
realize security increases further. For the traditional 
wired networks and web services, a lot of 
standardized security specifications, protocols and 
implementations like WS-Security (Lawrence, 
2004), SAML (Mishra, 2005) etc., exist, but not 
much has been explored and standardized in wireless 
environments.  Some of the reasons for this poor 
state might be the lack of active commercial data 
applications due to the limited resource capabilities 
of the mobile terminals. 
 Our study contributes to this work and tries to 
bridge this gap, with main focus at realizing some of 
the existing security standards in the mobile web 
services domain. In this study, we have analyzed the 
adaptability of WS-Security in the mobile web 
services domain. Mainly we observed the latency 
caused to performance of the Mobile Host, with the 
introduction of security headers into the exchanged 
SOAP messages. Performance penalties of different 
encryption and signing algorithms were calculated, 
and the best possible scenario for securing mobile 
web services communication is suggested. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 discusses the standards and on going 
projects for securing mobile web services domain. 
Section 3 addresses our security analysis setup and 
test cases. Section 4 summarizes the results and the 
means of securing mobile web services. Section 5 
concludes the paper with future research directions. 
2 SECURING MOBILE WEB 
SERVICE COMMUNICATION 
Mobile web service messages are exchanged using 
the SOAP over different transportation protocols 
like HTTP, UDP, and WAP etc. SOAP by itself does 
not specify the means of providing the security for 
the web service communication. Also many 
legitimate intermediaries might exist in the web 
service communication making the security context 
requirement to be from end-to-end. Hence the 
traditional point-to-point security technologies like 
the SSL, HTTPS and full encryption provided by the 
3G technologies like UMTS communication 
technology (Umtsworld, 2002) can’t be adapted for 
the mobile web services domain. These methods 
also affect the transport independency feature of the 
SOAP messages by restricting the messages to 
particular transportation protocols. 
For securing the wired web services, OASIS has 
developed different protocols like WS-Security and 
SAML using and extending the W3C protocols and 
standards SOAP, XML Encryption (Reagle, 2001), 
XML Signature (Eastlake, 2002) and WSDL. WS-
Security and SAML protocols make use of the 
composable and extendable nature of SOAP and 
embed the security information into SOAP headers. 
 
2.1 WS-Security 
The WS-Security specification from OASIS is the 
core element in web service security realm. It 
provides ways to add security headers to SOAP 
envelopes, attach security tokens and credentials to a 
message, insert a timestamp, sign the messages, and 
encrypt the message. The protocol ensures 
authentication with security tokens. Security tokens 
in combination with XML Encryption ensure 
confidentiality while security tokens in combination 
with XML Digital Signatures ensure integrity, of the 
SOAP messages.  
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Figure 1: Web Service Security specifications. 
Apart from WS-Security, web service security 
specifications also include WS-Policy which defines 
the rules for service interaction, WS-Trust which 
defines trust model for secure exchanges and WS-
Privacy which states the maintenance of privacy of 
information. Built with these set of basic 
specifications are the specifications, WS-
SecureConversation that specifies how to establish 
and maintain secured session for exchanging data, 
WS-Federation which defines rules of distributed 
identity and its maintenance, and WS-Authorization 
specification which processes the access rights and 
exchangeable information. The web service security 
specifications are shown in figure 1. (IBM, 2002) 
 
2.2 SAML 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) from 
OASIS primarily provides single sign on (SSO), 
cross domain interoperability, means of 
implementing the basic WS-Security standard 
through assertions, and helps in managing identity 
control across domains and organizations. SAML 
builds on top of the web service security 
specifications and provides a means by which 
security assertions can be exchanged between 
different service entity endpoints. 
The basic components of interest in SAML are 
assertions, protocols, bindings and profiles. SAML 
Assertions carry the authentication information 
while SAML Request/Response protocols tell how 
and what assertions can be requested. Bindings 
define the transportation of SAML protocols over 
SOAP/HTTP protocol. A SAML profile can be 
 created using the bindings, protocols along with the 
assertion structure. The SAML Request or SAML 
Response will reside in SOAP Body.  
SAML Request/Response protocol binding over 
SOAP will provide Assertions in the SOAP Body 
with information about authentication and 
authorization. Then SAML Assertions are used 
along with the WS security element which will 
reside in SOAP Header.  As the SAML Assertions 
contain key of the holder, it can be used to digitally 
sign the SOAP Body. At the Receiver end, the 
signature is verified with the help of the key and the 
access controls within the Assertion. 
 
2.3 LA 
Liberty Alliance project (LA, 2006) is the only 
global body which is working to define and provide 
technology, knowledge and certifications to build 
identity into the foundations of mobile and web 
service communication. It mainly concentrated on 
federated identity, because of the lack of 
connectivity between identities for internet 
applications in the current wireless technology 
especially in mobile networks. 
The basic components of Liberty Alliance are 
principal, identity provider and service provider. 
Principal is the requestor who needs to be 
authenticated. Identity provider is the one which 
authenticates and asserts the principal’s identity. The 
basic provisions of this project are federation which 
establishes relationship between any two of the 
above mentioned components, Single Sign On 
(SSO) where the authentication provided to principal 
by the identity provider can be maintained to other 
components such as service providers, and circle of 
trust where trust will be established between service 
providers and identity providers with agreements 
upon which principals can make transactions and 
exchange information in a seamless and secure way. 
3 EVALUATION OF WS-
SECURITY FOR SMART 
PHONES 
To secure the communication of our mobile web 
services provisioning, we have analyzed the 
adaptability of WS-Security in the mobile web 
services domain (Srirama, 2006b). The WS-Security 
adds many performance overheads to the mobile 
web service invocation cycle. Mainly, extra CPU 
capabilities are required to process the WS-Security 
related header elements. The transportation delays 
also increase significantly as the SOAP message size 
increases with the added security headers.  
During our performance analysis of the Mobile 
Host, we have observed that the transmission delays 
sum up to 90% of the total mobile web service 
invocation cycle times, in GPRS (GSMWorld, 2006) 
environment. The best solution to cope with this 
problem would be to increase the transmission 
capabilities of the wireless networks. With the 
introduction of 3G technologies like UMTS which 
promises a data transmission rate of approximately 2 
Mbps and the 4G announcement (4GPress, 2005) of 
achieving the 2.5 Gbps should make the 
transmission problem void. When such networks are 
adapted, the increase in the size of the message with 
security headers is not the major concern. 
To evaluate the WS-Security, we observed the 
latency caused to the performance of the Mobile 
Host, with the introduction of security headers. The 
performance penalties of different encryption and 
signing algorithms were calculated at the smart 
phone, and the best possible scenario for securing 
mobile web services communication is observed.  
 
3.1 Test setup 
The test setup used for WS-Security evaluation is 
shown in figure 2. The Mobile Host was developed 
and deployed on a smart phone. The mobile web 
service client invokes different web services 
deployed with the Mobile Host. The Mobile Host 
processes the service request and sends the response 
back to the client. The performance of the Mobile 
Host and the network latency were observed while 
processing the client request. 
 
WS
Internet
Mobile 
Infrastructure
Mobile 
Infrastructure
Mobile HostWS Client 
Identity Provider  
Figure 2: Mobile web service invocation test setup. 
For the test cases, generating the security keys at 
the smart phones was observed to be beyond their 
low resource capabilities. It was observed that the 
time taken for generating keys, especially PKI based 
asymmetric keys is very high. The times were in the 
 order of 1-3 minutes and were highly unpredictable. 
Hence a standalone end-point security provider 
(Identity Provider) was used to provide the keys and 
security information for the secured mobile web 
service communication. The keys are obtained by 
connecting to the identity provider across the mobile 
operator proprietary network and the Internet. The 
identity provider also helps in achieving SSO. The 
security assertions and keys were exchanged with 
the identity provider according to LA standards. 
For the analysis, two SonyEricsson P910i smart 
phones were used as web service requestor and 
Mobile Host. The smart phones had an internal 
memory of 64 Kb and ARM9 processor clocked at 
156MHz. The phones were connected to the Internet 
using a GPRS connection. The Mobile Host and 
client were developed using J2ME MIDP2.0 
(JSR118, 2002) with CLDC1.0 (JSR139, 2002) 
configuration. For cryptographic algorithms and 
digital signers, java based light weight cryptographic 
API from Bouncy Castle crypto package 
(BouncyCastle, 2006) was used. kSOAP2 
(KSOAP2, 2006) was modified and adapted 
according to WS-Security standard and utilized to 
create the request/response web service messages.  
 
3.2 Test cases 
Many basic services like the picture service, location 
data provisioning service, dir service and etc., were 
provided by the Mobile Host. For the test case 
analysis of security, addressed in this paper, we 
considered the location data provisioning service. 
The service provides the location details of the 
Mobile Host as GPS information. The smart phone 
connects to a socket based GPS device via Bluetooth 
for fetching the GPS co-ordinates. To observe the 
performance penalties for different message sizes, 
the request contained the <responseSize> element, 
which specifies the response size of the message 
being expected in Kb. The response was also added 
with an extra element <bodyPadding> to fill the 
remaining size of the response. The typical request 
and response of the service are shown in figure 3. 
 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="..." 
xmlns:xsd="..." xmlns:xsi="..."> 
<soapenv:Body> 
  <GPSProvider soapenv:encodingStyle  
                  ="..."> 
   <responseSize xsi:type="xsd:int">  
       1 </responseSize> 
  </GPSProvider> 
 </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
 
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope ...> 
 <SOAP-ENV:Body ...> 
<GPSProvider xmlns="ssn:SSNServer"  
     id="o0" SOAP-ENC:root="1"> 
 <result> 
  <Longtitude xsi:type="xsd:int">  
     606428</Longtitude> 
  <Latitude ...>5079068</Latitude> 
  <Altitude ...>22</Altitude> 
  <Speed ...>444</Speed> 
     <Status ...>1</Status> 
  <Comment xsi:type="xsd:string">      
     </Comment> 
 </result> 
 <Request-ID ...>2</Request-ID> 
 <bodyPadding xsi:type="xsd:string">  
     ...</bodyPadding> 
</GPSProvider> 
 </SOAP-ENV:Body> 
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope> 
Figure 3: Request and response messages of the location 
data provisioning service, respectively.  
To achieve confidentiality, the SOAP messages 
were ciphered with symmetric encryption algorithms 
and the generated symmetric keys were exchanged 
by means of asymmetric public key infrastructure 
(PKI) based methods. The messages were tested 
against various symmetric encryption algorithms, 
along with the WS-Security mandatory algorithms, 
TRIPLEDES, AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256. 
(RSA Labs, 2006) RSA with 1024 and 2048 bit keys 
was used for key exchange. Upon successful 
analysis of confidentiality, we tried to ensure data 
integrity of the messages. The messages were 
digitally signed and were evaluated against two 
signature algorithms, DSAwithSHA1 (DSS) and 
RSAwithSHA1 with 1024 and 2048 bit keys. The 
effect of signing on top of encryption was also 
studied.  
To summarize, the experiments leave us with 
four test cases for the analysis of WS-Security for 
smart phones.  
Unsecured MWS communication 
Encrypted MWS communication 
Signed MWS communication 
Encrypted + Signed MWS communication 
 
Each of these test cases was observed with 
different message sizes. The sizes of the response 
messages ranged from 1-10Kb. All the experiments 
were repeated at least 5 times and the mean of the 
values were observed for drawing conclusions, to 
have statistically valid results. 
 4 ANALYSIS AND THE RESULTS 
A typical web service message after applying the 
WS-Security is shown in figure 4. The SOAP 
message body can be completely encrypted or only 
parts of the message can be encrypted. The ciphered 
data is stored in the body of the updated message. 
The security information like encryption algorithms 
used, keys, digests, signing information is 
maintained in the SOAP header. The message shown 
below is the snapshot of a message encrypted with 
AES, and the key exchanged with RSA V 1.5. The 
message was later signed with RSAwithSHA1.  
 
<v:Envelope ...> 
 <v:Header> 
  <Security> 
   <n1:EncryptedKey ...> 
    <EncryptedMethod  
  Algorithm="...#rsa-1_5" /> 
    <CipherData> ... </CipherData> 
    <ReferenceList> 
 <DataReference URI="#4412525"/> 
  </ReferenceList> 
 </n1:EncryptedKey> 
 <n2:Signature ...> 
  <SignedInfo> <SignatureMethod  
        Algorithm="...#rsa-sha1" /> 
   <Reference>   <DigestMethod 
       Algorithm="...#sha1" />  
    <DigestValue>...</DigestValue> 
   </Reference> 
  </SignedInfo> 
  <SignatureValue>  
     ...</SignatureValue> 
  <KeyInfo> <KeyValue> <RSAKeyValue> 
     <Modulus>...</Modulus> 
     <Exponent>AQAB</Exponent> 
    </RSAKeyValue> </KeyValue>     
  </KeyInfo> 
 </n2:Signature> 
</Security> 
 </v:Header> 
 <v:Body> 
  <n0:EncryptedData Id="223940028" ...> 
<EncryptionMethod  
     Algorithm="...#AESEngine" /> 
 <CipherData> 
  <CipherValue>YeF7...</CipherValue> 
 </CipherData> 
</n0:EncryptedData> 
 </v:Body> 
</v:Envelope> 
Figure 4: A typical SOAP message with WS-Security. 
The example shown in figure 4 also hints the 
increase in size of the message with the added 
security header information. With our analysis we 
have observed that there is a linear increase in the 
size of the message with the security incorporation. 
Table 1 shows the variations in mobile web service 
message size with the applied security. The latency 
in the encrypted message size for a typical 5 Kb 
message is approximately 50%. 
Table 1: Message size variations (in bytes) with security. 
Original 
message size 1024 2048 5120 10240 
Message size 
with Signature 1726 2750 5822 10942 
Encrypted 
message size 1804 3168 7264 14092 
Secured 
message size 2611 3975 8071 14899 
 
4.1 Encrypted mobile web service 
communication 
To analyze the effects of XML Encryption on the 
mobile web service invocation cycle, the messages 
were encrypted with IDEA with 128 and 256 bit 
keys, DES with 64 and 192 bit keys and AES with 
128, 192 and 256 bit keys. The keys were exchanged 
using RSA with key sizes 1024 and 2048 bits. 
Figure 5 summaries the results of our encryption 
analysis and shows the comparison of latency for 
different encryption algorithms with keys exchanged 
using RSA 1024. To get the exact performance 
penalties and to exclude the transmission delays, the 
invocation cycle was observed on one smart phone.  
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Figure 5: Performance latencies with various symmetric 
key encryption algorithms and exchanging keys with RSA 
1024. 
The results suggest that AES 192 encryption 
turns out be the best symmetric key encryption 
method. But the difference in latencies with AES 
 192 and AES 256 are not so significant. So the best 
means of encrypting the message would be to use 
AES 256 bit key and to exchange the message with 
RSA 1024 bit key, both in terms of provided 
security and performance penalty. Still the increased 
latency with this best scenario is approximately 3 
times the latency without any security. The extra 
delays mainly constitute the times taken for 
encryption of request at the client, the decryption of 
request at the Mobile Host, the encryption of 
response at the Mobile Host and the decryption of 
response at the client. RSA 2048 key exchange was 
beyond the resource capabilities of smart phones. 
The results clearly reveal that the processing 
capabilities of today’s smart phones are not yet 
sufficient for providing proper message level 
security for mobile web services. Yet the 
performance penalties are well with in limits, ~= few 
seconds, and the approach can be used in providing 
proper security for mobile web services.  
 
4.2 Signed mobile web service 
communication 
To analyze the effects of XML digital signatures on 
the mobile web service invocation cycle, the 
messages were signed with two signature 
algorithms, DSAwithSHA1 (DSS) and 
RSAwithSHA1 with 1024 and 2048 bit key sizes. 
The latencies are shown in figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Performance latencies with signing the web 
service messages. 
The results suggest that the best way to sign the 
mobile web service message would be using RSA 
V1.5 with 1024 bit key. RSA algorithm is preferred 
ahead of the DSA, considering performance 
latencies. With a key size greater than 1024, signing 
is also beyond the resource capabilities of the smart 
phone, similar to asymmetric key exchange, using 
any of the considered algorithms. It was also 
observed that the latency by signing is slightly 
higher than the latency caused by the encryption, 
especially, when considering DSS signature.  
 
4.3 Secured mobile web service 
communication 
In real-time applications, to obtain the maximum 
security and to achieve confidentiality and integrity, 
both encryption and signing will be used on the 
messages. So, after the initial individual analysis of 
encryption and signing, we have checked the 
latencies for signing on top of encryption. Figure 7 
shows the latencies with the complete security 
applied on the mobile web service messages. The 
results are for a mobile web service message of 
request size 1 KB and response size 2 KB. 
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Figure 7: Performance latencies with signing on top of the 
encryption. 
From the test results we can conclude that the 
best way of securing messages in mobile web 
service provisioning is to use AES symmetric 
encryption with 256 bit key, and to exchange the 
keys with RSA 1024 bit asymmetric key exchange 
mechanism and signing the messages with 
RSAwithSHA1. RSA’s consideration for signing is 
not just based on the increased latencies of DSS, but 
also depended on the asymmetric key exchange 
mechanism considered. As we were using the RSA 
for key exchange mechanism, the keys can be reused 
for signing in the complete secured scenario. This 
saved us some initializations and thus reduced the 
latency in the RSA signature test cases.  
But there are still high performance penalties 
when the messages are both encrypted and signed. 
So we suggest encrypting only the parts of the 
message, which are critical in terms of security and 
signing the message. The signing on top of the 
 encryption can also be avoided in specific 
applications with lower security requirements. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The paper summarizes our comprehensive study on 
analyzing the security for mobile web services 
provisioning. In this paper we included our analysis 
of adapting the wired web service security 
specifications to the cellular world, with 
performance statistics. The results of our study are 
welcoming and the mobile web service messages of 
reasonable size, approximately 2-5kb, can be 
secured with standard specifications. But based on 
our till-date realization of security awareness in 
cellular networks, we conclude that secure web 
service provisioning in mobile networks is still a 
great challenge. The mechanisms developed for 
traditional networks are not always appropriate for 
the mobile environment and support at hardware like 
adding an encryption chipset is recommended. 
Our future research in this domain includes 
providing proper end-point security for the Mobile 
Host with federated identity and appropriate SSO 
strategy, using SAML and LA standards. We also 
want to have a detailed performance analysis of the 
Mobile Host with full security features through real-
time applications. We are also looking for 
alternatives, to reduce the security processing load 
on the Mobile Host using Enterprise Service Bus 
(ESB) (Borck, 2005) based mediation framework for 
maintaining the QoS of the Mobile Host. 
The increase in size of the message with the 
security headers is also quite daunting. We are 
currently focusing at XML compression and SOAP 
optimization techniques, to reduce the size of the 
message, there by improving the scalability of the 
Mobile Host. The scalability can also be maintained 
as part of QoS at the mediation framework. 
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